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Abstract 
This article studies the standard form contracts used by automobile manufacturers to 
purchase auto parts. It explores how the contracts reflect divisions of bargaining power, 
asymmetric information, problems of hold-up and renegotiation, and market competition. 
Based on interviews with representatives of buyers and suppliers, the article also 
describes the process of drafting the forms, the negotiation over price and other terms in 
the shadow of these forms, and the opportunities for non-drafters to extract improved 
terms. Some of the main lessons are: (i) The terms of the contracts and the bidding 
process prevent ex-post hold-up by suppliers (in contrast to the claims made by Benjamin 
Klein and others based on the GM/Fisher Body contract); (ii) There is surprisingly little 
ad-hoc tailoring of terms, even when such tailoring can increase the surplus from the 
deal; (iii) Internal organization structures are harnessed effectively to secure favorable 
bargaining outcomes; (iv) There is a significant variation between the standard forms 
utilized by the big automakers, in some of the most important aspects of the deals. This 
variation suggests that some of the terms are inefficient. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
* Ben-Shahar is Professor of Law and Economics; White is the Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law. The 
authors are grateful to many automotive officials who agreed to be interviewed for this study, and especially to 
Margaret Baxter of OESA for coordinating the suppliers’ survey. Helpful comments on an early draft were provided 
by two editors of the Michigan Law Review and by participants at the “Boilerplate” conference at the University of 
Michigan. Financial support from the Olin Center at the University of Michigan Law School is gratefully 
acknowledged.  
1 
1
Ben-Shahar and White:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2005
 BOILERPLATE AND ECONOMIC POWER  
IN AUTO MANUFACTURING CONTRACTS 
Introduction 
Manufacturing contracts in the automotive industry have served a canonical role in the 
economic theory of contract and bargaining. The famous story of General Motors’ relationship 
with its supplier Fisher Body in the 1920s is a landmark illustration of the problem of contractual 
hold-up, underlying a prominent theory of vertical integration and the nature of the firm.1 The 
theoretical fascination with automotive procurement contracts is well deserved. There may be no 
other merchant-to-merchant contractual template that governs such fantastic economic stakes—
hundreds of billions of dollars per year—and implemented through a process that involves 
almost no negotiation of the legal terms. Boilerplate rules these transactions. 
There is a long line of law-and-economics scholarship studying the attributes of standard 
form terms in contracts between sophisticated parties in high-stakes transactions. One of the 
benchmark predictions in this literature is that contractual terms have to be efficient if they are to 
be consistently used by the parties.2 Any rent-seeking power that a party has should be translated 
into a price advantage; it should not be used to dictate selfish but inefficient performance terms. 
Further, since legal terms such as warranties and remedies affect the costs borne by the parties, 
we expect that sophisticated parties will be “pricing” the terms and will be ready to redraft terms 
that cost more than they save. A study of automobile contracts provides an opportunity to test 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1. See Benjamin Klein, Hold-Up Problem, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and 
the Law 241 (Peter K. Newman ed., 1998); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical 
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297 (1978). 
2. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law 1–39 (1991); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 Yale L. J. 541, 545–46 (2003) (sophisticated firms are expected to write contracts that maximize efficiency). 
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 these predictions. These are transactions where economic power is unevenly distributed; much 
dickering takes place over prices and product design; but everything else is packed into 
boilerplate. Every party reads the boilerplate and understands its legal effect and its economic 
consequences. Do strong parties dictate efficient boilerplate and extract rents through prices and 
other purely distributive clauses? Do they tailor their terms to maximize their net gains from the 
transactions? 
Moreover, automotive supply contracts are the paradigmatic long-term relationships that 
require a great deal of relationship-specific investments in the form of machinery, location of 
plants and precontractual technology research. As the economic literature predicts, the 
dependence of suppliers (who must invest in specializing for their buyers’ needs) and buyers 
(who need specialized parts from their suppliers) gives opportunities for hold-up.3 These dangers 
make the contracts the primary tool to deter hold-up and to encourage investments. What are the 
contractual techniques used to address the risk of hold-up? 
In answering these questions, we have taken a simple, almost naïve approach. We read 
and compared the boilerplate contracts in the industry, and talked to lawyers who drafted these 
forms and to some non-lawyer participants in the industry. We provide a case study, but it yields 
some general insights. For example, the boilerplate contract terms between the Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and the tier-1 suppliers show how economic power is 
translated into transactional advantage. From the contract terms we can identify ways the OEMs 
extract value from their suppliers. Contrary to the fabled GM/Fisher Body story, we find no real 
problem of “hold-up” by suppliers. The claim that suppliers with a long-term contract can hold 
up the OEMs is based on a misunderstanding of the terms of the deal, the rules of contract law, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
3. Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 7 (1995); Oliver Williamson, The 
Economic Institutions of Capitalism 114-15 (1985). 
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 and the structure of the market. Moreover, comparing the terms that appear in the purchase 
orders of the various OEMs reveals ways in which they differ and, surprisingly, it suggests that 
some of these terms may foster inefficiency. Finally, studying the way the form contracts are 
drafted gives a detailed understanding of how and when “tailoring” of terms takes place and how 
internal organizational features are harnessed to affect the outcome of negotiations over contract 
terms. 
The study of contracting in the automotive industry also provides an opportunity to 
investigate the design of contracts in an industry that deals with fascinating economic changes. 
One major change has to do with the organization of production. By 1960 Ford was making 
almost everything from floor mats to steel within the company, and the other OEMs had a nearly 
equal degree of vertical integration.4 But since the early 1980s, the trend towards vertical 
integration has reversed.5 The biggest American OEM, General Motors, which used to produce 
up to seventy percent of its parts internally, is now only thirty percent integrated. OEMs have 
shed whole divisions, most notably Delphi6 and Visteon,7 and have started to buy large sub-
assemblies such as consoles, brake assemblies, and even frames from outside suppliers. With the 
business changing so vastly, have contracts changed as well? 
Another major change in the automotive industry is its profitability. American OEMs lose 
money; this is no secret. Ford and General Motors, two bastions of American industrial power, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
4. See Christoph Scherrer, Governance of the Automobile Industry: The Transformation of Labor and 
Supplier Relations, in Governance of the American Economy 209, 217–18 (John L. Campbell et al. eds., 1991). 
5. See id. at 220. 
6. Dale Buss, Perfect Storm: The Fate of U.S. Manufacturing Lies in the Hands of CEOs like 
Delphi’s J.T. Battenberg, Chief Executive, Oct. 2004, at 38. 
7. Robert Barker, Visteon: What’s that Funny Noise?, Bus. Wk., July 3, 2000, at 159. 
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 issue debt that is graded as junk.8 Since the OEMs are limited in their ability to renegotiate with 
their most burdensome creditors9—their current and retired employees—they have turned to 
their suppliers. The drive to save money by paying suppliers less that began in the mid-1980s has 
accelerated, and, as these suppliers are pressed, the pressure cascades down the supply chain. 
This study traces the cascade of the contract terms that suppliers are required to accept. 
The automotive supply industry is sometimes described as a pyramid, built in “tiers.”  At 
the top are the OEMs. The paper focuses mostly on the “Big Three” OEMs—General Motors, 
Ford, and DaimlerChrysler—but it looks also at six foreign OEMs who assemble cars in the U.S. 
and who are a growing force in the American manufacturing market. Directly below the OEMs 
are the “tier-1” suppliers—anyone who sells directly to an OEM. These companies usually sell 
sophisticated assemblies or parts, and most of them specialize in designing and manufacturing 
automotive-specific products. They purchase their supplies from “tier-2” suppliers, who in turn 
purchase from “tier-3” suppliers, and so on. Since there are only a few OEMs at the top, but there 
are roughly 600 to 800 tier-1 suppliers,10 a pyramid is an inaccurate metaphor. The metaphor is 
important, as we will explain below. The main issues that need to be governed by the contracts 
between OEMs and tier-1 suppliers are different than in lower tiers. Some of that difference will 
be attributed to the fact that there is a much smaller set of potential buyers above tier-1 sellers 
than there is above sellers in the lower tiers. 
This paper is structured as follows. Part I compares the terms and conditions in the 
purchase orders of the OEMs and highlights important differences in the substance of these 
                                                                                                                                                                           
8. Jamie Butters, Reasons for Junk Ratings: Downgraded GM, Ford Must Shrink, S&P Analyst Says, 
Detroit Free Press, May 7, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 7171742. 
9. Jeff Green, General Motors Comes Up Short in First Quarter, Seattle Times, Apr. 20, 2005, at E2; 
Eric Mayne, Ford May Cut Factory Jobs Next, Detroit News, June 23, 2005, at 1. 
10. Auto Industry M&A Value Soars, Auto Beat Daily, Nov. 12, 2003, at 1. 
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 boilerplate provisions. It argues that these differences cannot be easily reconciled with the 
prediction that sophisticated parties draft the most efficient boilerplate terms. Part II examines 
how these forms are drafted, how their terms are negotiated, and how the OEMs guard their 
terms from erosion. It provides some insight on how “tailoring” occurs and how the internal 
organization of a party to a deal affects the terms that this party can secure. Part III focuses on 
the role of economic power. There, we examine how power is harnessed to administer and 
modify contracts. This analysis revisits the claims made on the basis of the GM/Fisher Body 
deal, and argues that some of these claims are not valid. We demonstrate the subtle ways in 
which hold-up and renegotiation are curtailed. Finally, Part IV examines ways in which a less 
powerful party can nevertheless get favorable contract terms. 
I. The Contracts 
Supply contracts in the automotive industry are made through competitive bidding. An 
OEM issues requests for quotations (RFQs) for a particular part or assembly. The supplier whose 
bid is picked would ordinarily make a significant capital investment in R&D and production 
assets, and supply this part for the duration of the car model in which the part is assembled, a 
period which normally lasts four to eight years. The winning bidder, however, does not always 
get the security of a long-term, fixed-price contract. While some OEMs accord the supplier a 
long-term sourcing commitment, the actual purchase orders are issued on a short-term basis.11 
Shorter contracts give the parties opportunities to renegotiate aspects of the deal like price and 
quantity estimates; OEMs commonly demand (and receive) price reductions every year.12 
                                                                                                                                                                           
11. Original Equip. Suppliers Ass’n, OEM North American Production P.O. Contract Terms 
and Conditions Comparative Analysis 15 (2004) [hereinafter OESA]. 
12. Patricia Panchak, Supplier Partnerships Provide a Competitive Edge, Indus. Wk., Sept. 2004, at 9. 
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 Technically, most of these adjustments are not modifications of the contract, but rather renewals 
of short-term purchase orders (POs), all entered into under a master long-term agreement. 
The contracts we looked at are the boilerplate purchase orders governing the actual 
supply agreements. While there is some interest in the long-term master agreements, their 
language is usually brief and subordinates them to the terms of the shorter-duration POs. These 
forms are drafted by and issue from the OEMs through a process which will be described in 
Section II. Each OEM has a single form, titled either “Global Terms” or “General Terms,” which 
is used for procuring all of the manufacturing parts, almost without exception. General Motors, 
for example, enters into roughly one million procurement contracts every year, at a total amount 
in excess of $80 billion—all governed by a single contract form containing thirty-one 
paragraphs,13 translated into six languages. In terms of economic stakes, this form may be the 
single most important commercial contractual document ever drafted. In the remainder of this 
section, we compare the standard forms of the North American OEMs. 
Before we started this study, our conjecture was that we would find similar boilerplate 
language throughout this industry. Influenced by the economic theory of standard form contracts, 
we expected these contracts between ultra-sophisticated parties to include efficient arrangements. 
Surely the OEMs have significant bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers; but economic 
theory teaches us that it would be wise to use this power in extracting more favorable bottom line 
prices, not by extracting inefficient, one-sided legal terms.14 Moreover, our expectation that the 
forms would be uniform throughout the industry was influenced by the fact that they are all 
                                                                                                                                                                           
13. General Motors General Terms and Conditions (Sept. 2004) (on file with authors). 
14. Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-
Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 361 (1991); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive 
Unconscionability, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1053 (1977). 
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 issued in a highly repetitive fashion to the same group of tier-1 suppliers—those very large 
manufacturing companies that supply the main parts and assemblies to the OEMs. These are 
sophisticated counterparties who read the contracts and assess the costs of the terms. OEMs 
cannot “sneak in” inefficient terms that would go unnoticed. Further, a uniform format, we 
expected, would minimize drafting costs: Why draft a new form if your competitor already 
produced one? More importantly, it would also be consistent with learning externalities: Why 
start with a fresh form when there is already much experience in interpreting and relying on 
familiar language in existing forms? Finally, uniform templates would generate network 
externalities, by making it easier to predict costs (e.g., of warranty terms) in order to compare 
bids across companies and to price individual terms.15 In sum, based on observations about other 
industries,16 we expected little variation in the OEMs’ forms. 
What we found was a different reality. There is significant variance across the OEM 
contracts. We examined the boilerplates of nine North American OEMs,17 and recorded the many 
ways in which they differ. These differences were also confirmed in discussions with 
representatives of tier-1 suppliers and of the suppliers’ trade association, who emphasized that 
the differences in the legal terms represent in some cases significant variations in the economic 
consequences of the deals.  This variance, which we describe below, casts doubts on the 
robustness of a fundamental prediction of the economic theory of contracts, that standard form 
                                                                                                                                                                           
15. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting, 
83 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporate Law and Networks of Economic Effects, 81 Va. L. Rev. 
757 (1995). 
16. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical 
Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 Emory L.J. 929, 939 (2004). 
 
17. The nine OEMs who assemble cars in North America are: General Motors, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, 
Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Hyundai, VW, and BMW. 
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 contracts in sophisticated transactions are efficient. These contracts, recall, are between 
companies that have large in-house attorney staffs, who read the forms in their entirety, who have 
lifetime experience in the auto business, and who look to manage huge stakes with these 
contracts. If these forms vary in important ways, some of them must include terms that are less 
efficient—that is, terms that cost the weaker party more than they enrich the strong party. 
According to all of our interviewees, the most important issues in the OEM boilerplate 
contracts are the following: termination rights, warranties and remedies, tooling (the ownership 
of the production assets), intellectual property rights in technological innovations, and service 
parts. Consider each of these issues. 
Termination. In all purchase contracts, OEMs secure the right unilaterally to terminate the 
agreement.18 This right to terminate, which is not available to suppliers, is almost unrestricted. 
Either for no cause at all, or for reasons stated ambiguously as “competitiveness” of price and 
quality, the OEMs can, with short notice, terminate the contract. In fact, the cancellation rights 
are so one-sided that they might render the contracts unenforceable on the ground that they lack 
consideration or fail to state a quantity term under the statute of frauds.19 There is variation 
                                                                                                                                                                           
18. See, e.g., General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 13 (Sept. 2004) (on file with authors); 
Ford Motor Company Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions § 27 (Jan. 2004) (on file with authors); 
DaimlerChrysler Production Purchasing General Terms and Conditions § 20 (May 2003) (on file with authors). 
19. Ford’s contract says: “27.01 Termination. The Buyer may terminate the Purchase Order, in whole 
or in part, at any time and for any or no reason, upon Written Notice to the Supplier. The Supplier may not terminate 
at its option.” This term replaced an earlier termination clause that required a thirty-day notice. Similarly, General 
Motors’ contract gives it the right to cancel the transaction within thirty days if the supplier cannot match the rivals’ 
lower cost or competitive technology, design, or quality. These provisions come close to rendering the contracts 
illusory. Still, the requirement of a written notice in Ford’s contract, and of a thirty-day notice in GM’s contract, may 
constitute the necessary restriction to render these contracts enforceable. See, e.g., Williston, Law of Contracts 
9 
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 among OEMs’ forms regarding the payments to which suppliers are entitled upon termination. 
While all OEMs provide some recovery to suppliers for their squandered investments, some are 
stingy—they pay only for finished parts, work in progress, and raw materials.20 Others are more 
generous: they will pay for a combination of other termination costs, such as suppliers’ 
obligations to their own subcontractors and investments in capital.21 None of the OEMs cover 
suppliers’ unamortized investment in R&D and engineering—a great source of agony for 
suppliers who expect to cover their fixed costs only after several years of supply. Indeed, as we 
note below, OEMs recognize the potential unfairness of a sudden termination and are willing to 
grant ad hoc accommodations that go beyond their legal responsibility.22
                                                                                                                                                                           
§ 105, at 418–19 (3d ed. 1957). The termination term may also create a problem under the statute of frauds. Courts 
that have adjudicated similar provisions in lower tier cases, and one recent OEM/tier-1 case, have held the contracts 
to be unenforceable. See, e.g., Dedoes Indus., v. Target Steel, No. 254413, 2005 WL 1224700 (Mich. Ct. App. May 
24, 2005) (holding that a price quote in which seller promises to supply buyer’s steel requirements for the next three 
years does not satisfy the quantity provision of the statute of frauds); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Steel Dynamics, No. CR-
04-056983-CK (Cir. Ct. Oakland County, Mich. Aug. 4, 2004) (holding that GM’s award letter confirming the 
purchase of approximately 70,000 metric tons of steel did not satisfy statute of frauds because it contained only an 
approximate quantity, not a guaranteed purchase). 
20. See, e.g., Daimler Chrysler Production Purchasing General Terms and Conditions § 20 (May 
2003) (on file with authors); General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 13 (Sept. 2004) (on file with authors). 
21. See, e.g., Ford Motor Company Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions § 27.03 (Jan. 
2004) (on file with authors). 
22. The willingness of parties to go beyond the boilerplate and to grant concessions that are tailored ad 
hoc to the needs of their counterparts is discussed in Jason S. Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic 
Theory of Standard Form Contracts and the Negotiation of Business Relationships, 104 Mich. L. Rev. ___ (2006) 
and in Lucian Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Market, 104 Mich. 
L. Rev. ___ (2006); see also Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements, 
10 
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 It is difficult to identify the exact inefficiency that broad termination rights create, 
particularly since it is not clear how often these rights are exercised. Still, contracts containing 
harsh termination terms represent a de-facto transformation of the long-term commitment into a 
series of short term agreements. In this reality, suppliers anticipate pressures from OEMs to 
reduce prices even after they have been awarded a contract. This creates a risk of hold-up by 
OEMs—“reduce your price or be terminated”—that makes relationship-specific investments less 
valuable. 
Warranties and Remedies. Warranty provisions are important legal terms for they 
determine suppliers’ liability for design defects, intellectual property infringements, and the cost 
of precautionary recalls. OEMs specify what fraction of the total liability bill would be borne by 
suppliers, and grant themselves rights to setoff warranty charges against payments owed to 
suppliers.23 When an OEM finds itself liable for a design problem, there may be a genuine 
dispute as to whether the problem originates from a defective part for which the supplier is 
liable, or from faulty integration of the part by the OEM. Anticipating such future disputes, 
OEMs include standard clauses that grant them self-help power to recover from the supplier. 
GM’s right to recover 100% of the liability when it unilaterally decides that the parts failed to 
conform to the warranty, and to setoff the entire charge against the supplier’s account, are among 
                                                                                                                                                                           
70 Am. Econ. Rev. 356, 358–60 (1980); Clayton Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, Wis. L. Rev. 
679, 704–07 (2004). 
23. See, e.g., Ford Motor Company Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions §§ 11.01, 
23.06 (Jan. 2004) (on file with authors) (“Buyer may set off and recoup against the Buyer’s accounts payable to the 
Supplier any amounts for which the Buyer determines in good faith the Supplier is liable to it. [. . .] the Buyer may 
do so without notice to the Supplier.” And “at its option, the Buyer may debit the Supplier for up to 50% of the 
actual recall costs . . . if the Buyer has made a good faith determination that the Supplier is likely to be liable for 
some portion of the total costs . . . .”). 
11 
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 the toughest. Ford stipulates that the supplier’s share of liability will be negotiated ex post, but 
allows itself a unilateral setoff, to be charged before such negotiation concludes, of up to 50% of 
the cost. This setoff is against the amount owed by the supplier or by any of its more liquid 
affiliates and subsidiaries. Some companies’ terms entitle them to make the liability 
apportionment without the supplier being heard. Others provide that the parties will negotiate the 
allocation of liability costs to reflect actual responsibility.24
In practice, these variations in sharing-of-liability clauses reflect true differences in the 
cost allocations, and, importantly, they enable different systems for monitoring of defects. It 
appears that OEMs with the most self-serving warranty allocation terms are also ones that take 
longest to detect and resolve a defect. That is, they are the ones where the total costs of defects 
are, on average, greater. One of our interviewees quoted the warranty cost per vehicle to be 
roughly $1000 for an American OEM which uses the harshest warranty allocation terms,25 but 
only about $250 for a Japanese OEM that applies a more balanced approach.26 Further, he 
                                                                                                                                                                           
24. Some of the lower tier contracts we examined include an equally harsh warranty burden on the 
supplier. For example, some large tier-1 manufacturers put in their own contracts with tier-2s: a warranty burden of 
100% on the supplier. See, e.g., Delphi Corp. General Terms and Conditions § 7.3 (Mar. 2004) (on file with authors) 
(“If any goods are reasonably determined to fail to conform to the warranties set forth in this contract, Seller shall 
reimburse Buyer for all reasonable losses, costs and damages caused by such nonconforming goods.”) (emphasis 
added). There is an important difference, however, between the OEMs’ terms and the identical tier-1 terms. OEMs 
have the power to actually impose almost any share of the liability on their suppliers; tier-1s, in contrast, are more 
constrained, as they expect their suppliers to fight back. 
25. Jane Spencer, The Best Car Deal Around: Never Paying for Repairs—New Longer Warranties 
Open Door to Car Hypochondriacs, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 2002, at D1. 
26. Craig Fitzgerald, Getting Serious About Quality, Auto. Indus., July 2004, at 45. A different source 
suggests that American OEMs spend on warranty claims between $537 to $628 per vehicle, whereas Japanese 
12 
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 pointed out, the American OEM takes, on average, 180 days from the time of the first indications 
of a parts defect till it is resolved; the Japanese OEM takes only 40 days.27 Of course, Japanese 
cars may simply be better built than American cars. But other figures suggest that if there is 
quality gap, it is not as significant as represented in the warranty costs. One way to measure 
intrinsic quality is the average number of problems per 100 vehicles. Toyota and Honda, for 
example, reported in 2003 101 problems per 100 vehicles; GM, Chrysler, and Ford reported 
between 120 to 127 problems per 100 vehicles.28 This small quality gap is much smaller than the 
warranty cost gap, where an American OEM suffers a cost roughly four times as high as that of 
the Japanese OEM.  
These figures are consistent with the prediction that parties who believe that they can 
shift the cost of liability onto others would do less to reduce this cost. Put differently, in 
situations in which joint precautions by both supplier and buyer are necessary to prevent liability 
from mounting, or where suppliers can efficiently cure a defect, it is not surprising that the 
allocation of greater liability to the supplier reduces the OEM’s need for a quick solution to any 
quality issue.29 What is surprising is that not all contracts are designed to induce more 
participation of the suppliers in the warranty process, and thus fail to achieve efficiency.30
                                                                                                                                                                           
vehicles average only $226 per vehicle sold in the U.S. See 2003 US Auto Warranty Market Shares, Warranty 
Week, January 27, 2004, at  http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/ww20040127.html. 
27. Interview with Matthew Paroly, Delphi World Headquarters, Troy, MI (July 28, 2005). 
28. Fitzgerald, supra note 26. 
29. It is interesting to compare the OEM’s warranty terms with those appearing in the boilerplate 
purchase contract in Germany (“VDA”), which applies to all procurement contracts in all tiers. The VDA’s warranty 
and remedies provisions give the supplier a greater role in assessing any damage claim, participating in repairs and 
replacements, and being consulted before any action is taken by the buyer. The VDA’s terms also limit the duration 
of warranties, reduce their scope when the supplier is not negligent, and allow a host of opportunities to cure. See 
13 
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 Service Parts. The arrangements governing service parts can be a source of important 
profit for suppliers, as well as a significant burden. Service parts are sold in the retail market at a 
large premium. If the OEM alone may sell these parts, the supplier is deprived of a share of 
potential profits. Moreover, if the supplier is obligated to supply the OEM’s requirements for 
these parts for years after the model production ends (when it is expected that volume efficiency, 
materials, and skilled personnel will no longer be available), the burden on the supplier can be 
large.  
Almost all OEMs require the supplier to agree to supply service parts for a period of ten 
to fifteen years after current-model production ends. Some OEMs, however, share the surplus 
that this production will yield. Honda and Toyota,31 for example, stipulate that the service part 
prices will be negotiated by the parties when the time comes; that translates to a profit-sharing 
deal. Others (e.g., GM) require prices to remain at their low, production-phase price for an initial 
period, say three years,32 after which a higher negotiated price would be agreed upon. Most 
                                                                                                                                                                           
The German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA) General Terms and Conditions (English Translation, 
May 12, 2002) (on file with authors). 
30. Similarly, OEMs draft broad indemnity terms, entitling them to reimbursements of legal defense 
expenses of claims (such as products liability) for which the supplier will ultimately be responsible. Suppliers are 
nervous about their inability to control or influence the litigation of such claims, and at the same time their 
responsibility for the outcome of the litigation and its cost. 
31. See, e.g., Toyota Motors Manufacturing North America, Inc. Terms and Conditions § 4.2(d) (Oct. 
1998) (on file with authors) (“[Toyota] will establish, after good faith negotiation with Supplier, a price for Service 
Parts.”). 
32. General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 20 (Sept. 2004) (on file with authors) (“During 
the 15 year period after Buyer completes current model purchases, Seller will sell goods to Buyer to fulfill Buyer’s 
past model service and replacement parts requirements . . . . The prices during the first 3 years of this period shall be 
those in effect at the conclusion of current model purchases.”). 
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 harsh are terms that require suppliers to commit to fifteen years of post-production supply and to 
refrain from raising prices above the production-phase prices.33 These provisions were described 
by a tier-1 supplier as “cyanide pills”—leaving the supplier with the high cost of maintaining a 
production line but without the ability to recoup this expense through high volume of sales. 
The service parts provisions are not only a matter of division of surplus; they also have 
efficiency implications. When a car model is discontinued by an OEM, the production volume of 
parts obviously decline substantially. Maintaining the production line and the skilled labor to 
produce the parts will be expensive. Pricing the parts based on a cost structure prevailing on 
much larger volume is a poor way to reflect the true wholesale economic price and it may lead to 
sub-optimal purchase decisions. For example, supplier representatives complained about the 
OEMs’ reluctance to hold minor inventories of parts and their tendency to make frequent small-
volume purchases; that requires the suppliers to “turn on the machines” repeatedly to produce 
small, highly inefficient, quantities of parts. Schemes that accord the suppliers a greater share of 
the surplus might create incentives to reduce these inefficiencies. 
Intellectual Property. The production of assembly parts often requires the development 
and application of new technologies that have high value as intellectual property beyond that 
particular application. Much of this technology passes over to the OEMs in the course of 
designing the parts and assembling them into the vehicles. The contracts grant the OEMs legal 
rights in these valuable information assets, not only to use them in production, but also to control 
other uses. Suppliers—particularly those for whom the technology is the main asset—care 
greatly about this type of appropriation. Here, too, there is surprising variation in the scope of 
rights secured by different OEMs. The most extreme position accords the OEMs unlimited rights 
to all intellectual property of the supplier that is disclosed in the course of trade, except for 
                                                                                                                                                                           
33. See, e.g., Nissan North America, Inc. Master Purchase Agreement § 19 (2003). 
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 patents registered prior to the supply.34 Suppliers also waive their trade secret protection, and 
assign to the OEMs all copyrightable works created under the contract without any royalty 
rights. These rights are often for unlimited duration, extending beyond the termination of the 
contract. The more restrained position of other OEMs limits the OEM’s right to sublicense 
intellectual property and guarantees that the confidential information of the supplier will not be 
disclosed.35
As will be noted below, some suppliers refuse to grant such rights in their intellectual 
property. Companies whose main business is information technology (IT), such as the makers of 
software, are stubborn about this, and OEMs have learned to expect that they will not be able to 
dictate their terms to such suppliers. Indeed, some OEMs have specially drafted IT contracts that 
accommodate the expectations of their IT suppliers for more balanced terms. Still, most 
production parts are supplied by manufacturing companies whose main business is not IT, and 
these suppliers were not able to protect their investment in innovative technology as well as the 
IT suppliers do. 
Since OEMs do not tailor their intellectual property terms specifically for each supplier, 
the boilerplate can be a significant source of inefficiency. Suppliers that have the ability to 
develop new technologies, but who cannot enjoy the full value of the technology they develop 
once appropriated by the OEM, will have a weaker incentive to make investments. We can only 
speculate that OEMs that insist on harsh IP terms end up with cars that incorporate fewer 
technological advances. Some of the suppliers’ representatives suggested that this is the case. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
34. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions §§ 16, 20.01 (Jan. 
2004) (on file with authors); Hyundai Motor Manufacturing General Terms and Conditions § 19 (on file with 
authors). 
35. See, e.g., General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 14 (Sept. 2004) (on file with authors); 
Nissan North America, Inc. Master Purchase Agreement § 15.2 (2003) (on file with authors). 
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 Tooling. The machinery and production assets used in manufacturing requires costly 
investments. When an OEM pays for these investments, the contract establishes that the OEM 
owns the tooling and permits the supplier to use the tooling to serve this OEM. The OEM 
contracts forbid commingling—the use of the tools for assembly of parts directed to other 
OEMs. Thus, on termination, OEMs can haul away the tooling, and even charge the supplier 
with some of the costs of shipping.  
Representatives of tier-1 suppliers voiced many complaints against the tooling 
provisions. A repeated complaint was that OEMs refused to allow the use of production assets to 
serve multiple clients. The strict ownership terms and the restriction against commingling and 
co-serving can lead to wasteful duplicity of investments, and, of course, to inefficiency. 
Moreover, this strict control of the machines makes the OEMs’ potential threat to terminate a 
contract (and haul away the production line) more credible. The fear that relationship-specific 
investments by the suppliers would be squandered increases. 
What can we learn from these examples of fundamental variations in the contract terms? 
We present this variation in the contracts as a puzzle; it casts some doubt over the efficient-terms 
hypothesis. While each OEM has its own boilerplate, there is surprisingly little borrowing from 
each other. Each OEM knows its competitors’ forms well, but rarely copies any provision from 
them. In this sense, boilerplate in this industry has not risen to the level of “quasi-statute” that it 
achieved in other industries.36 And while factors relating to corporate “culture” can explain the 
persistence of this variation and the lack of convergence, it is hard to find an efficiency 
explanation.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
36. Stephen Choi & Mitu G. Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 Mich. L. Rev. ___ (2006); Michelle 
Boardman, Contra Proferentem — The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 Mich. L. Rev. ___ (2006). 
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 Of course, contract terms do not always reflect actual practices. The actual behavior 
under the contract may not vary as much as the variation in contract language. There is some 
indication that OEMs may not enforce inefficient one-sided terms. For example, in a section 
titled “Supplier Frequently Asked Questions” appended to its Global Terms and Conditions, Ford 
explains that one of the most troubling new provisions in this form, the setoff term, was never 
used literally and only infrequently used at all.37 So it is possible that the inefficiency of some 
terms is only on paper and that in practice the OEMs apply systematic “tailored forgiveness” of 
some of the harsher provisions.38 Still, it is hard to reconcile this understanding with the angry 
opposition that suppliers displayed towards Ford’s recent redraft and the collective effort that 
suppliers invested through their association to change some of the terms. 
We believe that the variations in the boilerplate terms do, in some cases, reflect 
inefficiency. True, efficiency does not always require homogeneity. In fact, oligopolistic 
competition may often generate product differentiation. But OEMs’ contracts are not “products” 
that suppliers pick along a spatial dimension. The variation in terms does not provide any 
advantage of improved “matching” or increased markets. Nor does the “menu” of contracts 
available in the industry force suppliers to “self-select” (as in the case were only high-quality 
suppliers can afford to accept a harsh warranty term). The story of the boilerplate is by-and-large 
an account of economic power, perhaps gone astray.  
We do not claim that the boilerplate terms are the cause of the inefficiency. It is more 
plausible that many of these provisions, as we will argue below, are tailored to leverage the 
OEMs’ economic and bargaining power in the negotiation stage into advantages at the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
37. Ford Motor Company Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions, Supplier Frequently 
Asked Questions, § 11.02 (Jan. 2004) (on file with authors). 
38. See Johnston, supra note 22. 
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 performance stage, in which the parties are locked in a classic bilateral monopoly. The legal 
terms in the forms are the tail that is wagged by the business dog, not vice versa. It is clear that 
the American OEMs’ record-breaking losses have driven them to capture any opportunity to shift 
cost to suppliers. But if indeed they do so in a way that reduces the overall surplus of the 
contracts, what we are witnessing is a classic agency problem: agents find ways to save costs in 
the domain that they control, but often neglect to consider the effect of these cost-saving 
measures on activities that they do not control. If the pressure on suppliers is strong enough, they 
will accept harsh terms and low prices. And if there are inefficient consequences, they may 
eventually be counted on the scorecard of a different internal division. The lawyers and 
purchasing officials who write and negotiate the supply contracts invest much effort in tightening 
up the legal terms and in leveraging the OEMs’ bargaining power in securing adherence to these 
terms. It is possible that this exercise of their power will degrade suppliers’ cooperation and 
performance in ways that become clear only later. 
II. Drafting of Boilerplate 
One of the striking features of automotive supply contracts between OEMs and their tier-
1 suppliers is their simplicity. Each OEM has a single form, used for procuring all of the 
manufacturing parts. General Motors, we mentioned, enters into roughly one million 
procurement contracts every year with suppliers all over the world. With very little exception, 
these deals are governed by GM’s “Global Terms”—terms that are never  challenged, neither at 
the negotiation stage (e.g., by battle of the forms) nor in litigation.39
                                                                                                                                                                           
39. Only three litigated cases between OEMs and their suppliers were found. In the most recent, GM 
was granted summary judgment. Nartron Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 232085, 2003 WL 1985261, at *9 (Mich. 
Ct. App. April 29, 2003). Another arose because of a fight over an indemnification provision: A third party was hurt 
while installing a piece of equipment at GM’s plant and the equipment manufacturer tried (successfully) to get out of 
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 Another notable feature of these boilerplate forms is their durability. DaimlerChrysler, for 
example, is still using the form that was drafted in 1985; GM’s form goes back to 1986. Ford’s 
old form had been in place since the 1950s, until it was recently revised in quite a dramatic 
fashion in 2004. While minor revisions are patched onto these forms occasionally, addressing 
“new” problems,40 the main terms and conditions remain unchanged over a long period of time. 
This rigidity of the forms is not so much a feature of interpretive or learning externality (that is, 
the adherence to something familiar with a predictable meaning), but rather a reflection of an 
OEM’s belief that the terms in its form work well and serve its profit goals. 
These boilerplate contracts are simple. The terms are written in plain English. Although 
most of the tier-1 suppliers are large corporations with sophisticated legal counsel who read 
every word of the OEM contracts, and although each provision in these contracts can have 
significant effects on the division of the surplus, the clauses are drafted in a much simpler and 
shorter form than ordinary consumer contracts. For example, GM’s warranty provision is three 
sentences long. The main part says that “Seller warrants/guarantees that the goods covered by 
this contract will conform to the specification, drawing, samples, or description furnished to or 
by Buyer, and will be merchantable, of good material and workmanship and free of defect.”41 
The warranty paragraph adds that the goods “will be fit and sufficient for the particular purposes 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the indemnification provision that was in GM’s purchase order. Hallberg v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 87 C 6478, 1989 
WL 153340 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 1989). The only other case is from 1979. S.C. Gray, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 286 
N.W.2d 34 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). 
40. An example for the type of revisions we observed is GM’s employment conditions clause, 
requiring the supplier to refrain from engaging in “corrupt business practices” such as utilizing child and prisoner 
labor. See General Motors General Terms and Conditions, Revised Draft § 25 (Sept. 2004) (on file with authors). 
41. See General Motors General Terms and Conditions, Revised Draft § 9 (Sept. 2004) (on file with 
authors). 
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 intended by the Buyer” and that the duration of the warranty will match the warranty provided by 
the Buyer to its customers.42 This paragraph is strikingly different than warranty terms in, say, 
consumer contracts, which are usually lengthy, cumbersome, and legalistic. Perhaps this 
difference owes to the greater government regulation of consumer warranties; perhaps it has to 
do with the identity of the drafter—a buyer or seller. A seller-drafter needs to avoid the sweeping 
warranties of the UCC, whereas buyers like the OEMs need only to strengthen the pro-buyer 
UCC warranties. Note, also, that the difference between warranty terms in the auto production 
context and other, consumer-related, contracts cannot be explained by factors like trade usages 
and course of dealings. The supplier’s warranty to the OEM is governed solely by the express 
warranty term. 
Since boilerplate terms have to deal with many different types of situations and address 
many possible contingencies, drafting the standard form from scratch would seem a daunting 
task. It is often perceived, therefore, that the drafting of boilerplate language in mass contracts 
involves not much more than a cut-and-paste task, whereby the “drafter” identifies similar forms 
used by other organizations that do similar business and—on the premise that “if they work for 
others they’ll also work for me”—borrows their language.43 Interestingly, however, the 
American OEM supply contracts were not drafted in this fashion. Each OEM contract was 
                                                                                                                                                                           
42. Id. Ford’s Purchase Order form is an exception, in that it is a long contract stretching over thirty-
one pages. This form, which was launched in 2004 following a significant overhaul, also contains simple language, 
but it covers many more contingencies than other OEM contracts. Still, Ford’s warranty term is almost identical to 
GM’s, and equally short. 
43. There are many theoretical accounts of this “stickiness” of boilerplate. See, e.g., Kahan & 
Klausner, supra note 15, at 761–64; Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the 
Shadow of the International Order, 53 Emory L.J. 691, 713-21 (2004); Choi & Gulati, supra note 36, at 61; Omri 
Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of Contractual Default Rules, Fl. St. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006). 
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 drafted by in-house attorneys in a concentrated effort over a short period of time, with very little 
revision since.44 These attorneys are familiar with the forms utilized by their competitors, but 
seldom copy or borrow language from these sources. Unlike the drafting work done by outside 
law firms, the in-house drafting attorneys have a task that is ongoing. While revisions in the 
forms are rare, the drafting attorneys remain with the organization for a long period of time, 
carrying with them the “institutional memory” concerning the drafter’s intent and the rationales 
for the chosen language. Memory, of course, is a necessary trait for parties who enter long-term 
relationships or into portfolios of deals, where violations are addressed (and deterred) by 
informal sanctions within the relationship or by refusals to deal.  
Given the simplicity of the forms and the ambitious goal to apply them to each and every 
manufacturing parts contract, how do OEMs overcome the different needs and objections of their 
tier-1 suppliers? Part of the answer, of course, concerns the performance and enforcement 
strategies, which we will discuss later. There, we will show, some patterns of flexibility have 
emerged. In the contract formation stage, however, we observe very little flexibility. Either take 
our contract as it is, or leave. This rigidity is maintained in several ways, as explained below. 
No Battles of Forms. Battles of forms, where the seller responds to the OEM’s purchase 
order with a confirmation that contains different boilerplate terms, have the standard result that 
conflicting terms on both sides drop out. The battle of the forms might, of course, enable a 
supplier to substitute their own terms for some of the OEM’s more onerous terms. One might 
predict that the battle of the forms would be common in automotive contracting. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
44. But see Klaus-Dieter Floerecke, German Suppliers Revolt Against Ford Motor: Vendors Demand 
Contract Revisions, Auto. News, Apr. 19, 2004, at 10. 
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 As far as we were able to determine, there is no battle-of-the-forms maneuvering against 
OEMs.45  We could not find reference to a single legal dispute on battle of the forms with an 
OEM, and none of the OEM or tier-1 representatives were able to quote an example.46 Battles-
of-the-forms disputes are avoided, not by forcing the supplier to acquiesce ex post to the OEM’s 
terms. Rather, they are prevented ex ante by the OEMs insisting at the time that bids are invited 
that, as a condition for bidding, the supplier must agree to be bound by the boilerplate terms of 
the OEM’s form. Since the bidding occurs before the contract has been “issued” and at the time 
when the supplier’s position is the weakest—at the time when its refusal to commit to the OEM’s 
boilerplate could cost it the opportunity to bid—it is not surprising that most tier-1 suppliers 
agree not to engage in the battle of the forms and instead sign or otherwise agree to a form that 
binds them to the OEM terms.47
Suppliers who do attempt to sneak in their boilerplate terms—either on the invoices or 
acknowledgments, or through what they sometimes call “letters of interpretation” or side-
memos—are generally doomed to fail. OEM attorneys instruct their purchasing managers to 
abort any incipient attempt to engage in the battle of the forms by affirmatively rejecting any of 
the sellers’ forms or by getting the seller’s signature on the buyer’s form. The same is true for 
                                                                                                                                                                           
45. We suspect, but we could not confirm, that the battle of the forms may occur as one goes deeper 
into the supply chain down to tier-3 and tier-4 suppliers. 
46. But see supra note 32. 
47. For example, suppliers who objected to Ford’s new Global Terms and Conditions “were threatened 
with new business hold and award of pending business to competitors.” See Urgent Ford Global Terms and 
Conditions: Status Report Web Conference, OESA (Apr. 2, 2004).. That survey shows that thirty-one out of 
forty-six Ford suppliers were warned that they would experience business reduction if they refused to accept Ford’s 
terms.  
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 other sophisticated, high-tier buyers when dealing with the forms of their own downstream 
suppliers.48
No Authority to Dicker. Another way in which OEMs prevent deviations from their own 
terms is by restricting the authority of agents within the organization to approve different or 
additional terms. Suppliers in the chain periodically try to negotiate or change the terms of the 
boilerplate imposed by the OEMs or other buyers. Both OEM and supplier representatives agree 
that changes in the boilerplate resulting from negotiations with an individual seller are as rare as 
hens’ teeth. Ford, for example, has erected a clever and conscious barrier to such negotiation. At 
that company, only the global vice president for purchasing has the authority to change the terms 
on the form contract. Similarly, in another OEM we observed a procedure in which only a senior 
purchasing committee of executives can approve a variation from the standard terms. By taking 
the authority away from the lower level purchasing agents and their executives, and granting it 
only to a person who presumably does not answer every phone call, these companies have raised 
a significant barrier to negotiation. Thus, no revision of a term can occur unless the person 
proposing it can talk to someone in authority or can persuade a lower level person to do so. And 
what first level purchasing manager wishes to besmirch his in-firm reputation as a tough 
negotiator and impair his chances for advancement by proposing to the big boss that the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
48. The finding that battles of the forms almost never occur is based on many conversations with 
attorneys in the industry. It may well be, though, that the picture portrayed by attorneys is not precise. Purchasing 
agents and engineering officers may have a particular interest in the deal—say because of the attractive price or the 
unique technology offered by the supplier—which would lead them to care little whether some “legal” terms are 
contested in a boilerplate letter sent by the supplier. The attorneys’ score card, on the other hand, depends on their 
success in blocking ex post disputes and securing the most favorable boilerplate terms. It is perhaps this desire to 
boast and to display a successful legal record that distorts the picture we report. 
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 company make concessions to a tier-1 supplier? In fact, this barrier is recognized by suppliers as 
credible and intimidating, discouraging them from demanding that some terms be negotiated. 
Furthermore, any variation in the legal terms would need to be drafted by a staff attorney. 
The legal offices of the OEMs simply do not have the resources to oversee frequent changes in 
the thousands of contracts entered into daily. This lack of legal capacity is another internal 
organizational hurdle, known to suppliers and deemed credible by them, that blocks any process 
of dickering over the legal terms. 
Equality of Treatment. Another factor that limits the incidence of variation from the 
boilerplate terms is the strong formal commitment of OEMs to treat all their suppliers equally. Of 
course, transactions with suppliers vary significantly with respect to the goods purchased, prices, 
volume, and the like. But all suppliers—from the mega corporations who produce car frames to 
the sellers of nuts and bolts—must take the same legal terms: payment provisions, termination 
rights, warranties and remedies, and the like. OEMs believe that the fact that these terms are 
presented as non-negotiable and that variations are not approved provides their suppliers with 
assurance that there is horizontal equity, that everyone is treated the same. In fact, this equity 
factor is a reason why one of the OEMs recently revised its entire set of boilerplate provisions. It 
clarified to its suppliers that any concession negotiated by them in previous contracts would, of 
course, be honored for the duration of that contract (usually one year), but thereafter all terms 
would revert to the new set of “Global Terms and Conditions,” and the old concessions would 
expire unless affirmatively approved by the vice president.49 OEMs believe that suppliers 
recognize that more is at stake for the OEM than the individual concession. Their implicit 
position—“if we give one of you an accommodation, we’ll have to give it to others”—works 
                                                                                                                                                                           
49. Ford Motor Co. Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions § 4.09 (Jan. 2004) (on file 
with authors). 
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 strategically to block any accommodations, in the same way that most-favored-nation clauses 
bolster the commitment to avoid price discounts.50
Open-Ended Provisions. The automotive industry is the typical example for a market in 
which contractual arrangements are long-term. This is particularly true of OEM/tier-1 
relationships, where there are specific agreements to procure parts as long as the car model is 
produced, normally four to eight years. But relationships also extend beyond a single model, to 
encompass many such car-model contracts, and to cover the many years of supply of service 
parts. Given the difficulty of anticipating many factors that may become relevant in the course of 
performing the agreements, it is commonly noted that contracts signed up front must exhibit 
flexibility and must leave room for governance by ad hoc adjustments, agreements to agree, and 
informal norms. Indeed, the OEM boilerplate forms, although “tight” in many respects, contain 
many open-ended provisions that allow the parties to determine, in due time and if the 
contingency arises, matters of significant value. These open-ended clauses include price 
adjustments for changes in design; allocation of liability regarding the cost of recalls and other 
failures of components; indemnification of litigation costs in defending against injury claims by 
car owners and infringement of intellectual property claims; and more. These clauses leave it to 
the parties to “attempt in good faith to reach agreement” or to “negotiate diligently” the precise 
ex post term. In this way, up front dickering is avoided, and suppliers are willing to accept the 
contract although none of their needs are directly addressed. 
Interestingly, OEMs use such open-ended provisions to address some of the issues that 
would otherwise be most troubling for suppliers. When Ford recently redrafted its entire form, 
suppliers were invited to voice their concerns and reactions to the proposed draft. While these 
meetings were not an open invitation to negotiate the new terms, they did represent the closest 
                                                                                                                                                                           
50. Avinash K. Dixit & Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically 147–48 (1991). 
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 thing to negotiations over boilerplate, whereby uniform objections by suppliers did lead to 
some—albeit minor—changes in the draft. Specifically, suppliers were disgruntled over terms 
that allowed OEMs to impose costly changes in design, terms that permit OEMs to setoff any 
cost incurred in servicing a recall or a warranty against the account of the supplier of the 
allegedly defective part, and terms that allocate a fixed share of the liability to the suppliers. Not 
surprisingly, it is with respect to these issues that the OEM elected to implement open-ended 
terms, postponing the dickering of the actual resolution of individual cases, if the issues arise, to 
the post-performance stage. 
The Dissemination of Boilerplate Terms Across Tiers. OEM contracts with their tier-1 
suppliers affect the contracts entered into in lower tiers. Tier-1 suppliers, being strapped to the 
onerous OEM terms, turn around and offer the same terms to their own tier-2 suppliers. Of 
course, they may have less bargaining power to mandate their own terms, but at least the very 
large tier-1 companies—the twenty-five or so mega-corporations like Delphi and Visteon that 
supply a large portfolio of parts—ordinarily have enough leverage to require suppliers to use 
their terms. Representatives of tier-1 suppliers admitted to us that they would have much 
preferred to use a more balanced contract both upstream and downstream (which again suggests 
that the OEMs terms are inefficient—the tier-1 companies are shielded from the terms’ 
distributive effect, and can be averse to them only because of the waste that they create). But 
given the OEM terms that are imposed on them in their capacity as sellers, they cannot afford to 
use other terms in their capacity as buyers. A striking metaphor that a tier-1 representative used is 
“contractual DNA.” Looking at contracts down the supply chain, one can identify the OEM for 
which a given supply is eventually intended by the terms of the lower tier contracts. With each 
tier buyer copying some of the terms it had to accept as a supplier, the OEM’s terms are 
“genetically” replicated down the chain. 
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 The special position of tier-1 suppliers explains their ambivalence towards the otherwise 
concerted effort of suppliers in the automotive industry to advocate for “fairer” contracts. Some 
of this effort is coordinated by the suppliers’ association, OESA. One of the projects of this 
association was the drafting of the Model General Terms and Conditions, which is a self-
proclaimed “more balanced approach to buyer-seller relations” with the goal of “increas[ing] 
cooperation, communication, and trust between buyers and sellers.”51 Tier-1 representatives have 
generally been less than enthusiastic, however, in supporting this initiative. Their concern is that 
if such an initiative would succeed and the use of the model terms would become a standard 
request of suppliers, it would harm their position vis-à-vis their lower tier suppliers, without 
helping them much vis-à-vis the OEMs. If a tier-1 supplier has to sign a fixed-price contract with 
an OEM for five years, he needs a contract with a tier-2 supplier that extends for the same period 
of time to enable him to maintain the fixed price.52  
III. Economic Power 
Although courts and lawyers sometimes talk about form contracts as non-negotiable and 
subject to no limits, we know that is not true. Some drafters pull back from the limit of their 
economic power, some decline to exercise the rights that their contract gives, some contracts are 
                                                                                                                                                                           
51. Original Equip. Suppliers Ass’n, OESA Publications: Model Terms and Conditions 3 (Oct. 
2004), available at http://www.oesa.org/publications/index.php (last visited Jan. 10, 2006). 
52. In Germany an organization called the Verband der Automobilindustrie (VDA) negotiates with the 
OEMs on behalf of the suppliers. The OEM forms used in Germany are the product of this collective bargaining. If 
initiatives in the United States like OESA’s are to succeed the way they succeed in Germany, they have to start with 
the OEMs; the terms will then trickle down the supply tiers. Because the OEMs do not appear willing to enter into 
such a bargain and because the tier-1 suppliers cannot afford to enter into a bargain with the OEMs entering into one 
first, we do not foresee a collective agreement in the United States among the suppliers and the OEMs of the kind 
that apparently exists in Germany. 
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 invalidated by courts, and others are constrained by legislation, regulation, or by threat of 
litigation or legislation. In this part we examine how market power shapes the deals and the 
contracts, with an eye to the specific provisions in the OEMs’ purchase orders that are aimed at 
securing their economic power. 
At the outset of this study, we hypothesized that OEMs’ bargaining power would be 
strongest at the bidding and contract formation stage and weakest once relationship-specific 
investments were made and performance began. We imagined that once the OEMs became 
dependent on a supplier, they would face instances of hold-up, where the supplier demanded 
better price and other terms. The standard hold-up account seems to fit this situation perfectly—
in fact, the hold-up theory was developed in the context of the GM/Fisher Body saga, which was 
an OEM/tier-1 relation. This hypothesis turned out to be surprisingly misguided, as we will 
explain below. We also hypothesized that economic power would echo down the supply tiers, 
with tier-1 suppliers being dominated by OEMs but exercising their own dominance over tier-2 
suppliers. This too turned out to be only partially true. Some powerful companies, such as Exxon 
and General Electric, are in the tier-2 levels and are able to wield power because of their size and 
product mix. Other tier-2 suppliers have power because of their wide base of clients, extending 
beyond the automotive industry, and can afford to pass on automotive contracts. Yet other low 
tier suppliers have power that is supported by the uniqueness of their technology. Finally, the 
financial integrity of a firm turned out to affect its economic power in ways that are more subtle 
than we expected. 
As we mentioned above, the OEM representatives freely admitted that their forms 
included most terms that the drafters thought necessary or helpful to protect their clients’ 
interests, and that they did not feel obliged to add similar terms that their sellers might have 
liked. For example all of the OEM contracts (and presumably most between suppliers) give the 
29 
29
Ben-Shahar and White:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2005
 buyer the right to terminate the contract without cause in certain circumstances and to cancel it 
for cause in other cases. The sellers get no corresponding rights of termination or cancellation. 
This power, along with the absence of a quantity commitment on the part of the OEM, makes the 
contract so one-sided that it runs the risk of being unenforceable.53 European suppliers have 
complained that such one-sided terms would be unenforceable under various European doctrines 
of contractual fairness, competition law (e.g., the term prohibiting suppliers from selling parts in 
the aftermarket), and corporate governance (the supplier’s corporate executive may not have the 
internal authority to sign such a poor contract without shareholder authorization).54
How far can OEMs go in drafting one-sided terms? Surely, if suppliers have choices, they 
can bargain away these clauses. But for automotive suppliers who sell a large chunk of their 
output to OEMs, in a market in which suppliers suffer severe over-capacity, there does not 
appear to be much choice. A CEO of one of Ford’s suppliers was quoted in the Automotive News 
to say that Ford’s terms are effective in “closing every possible loophole. We’re responsible for 
acts of God now.”55 At the same time, the collective disgruntlement that echoed in the suppliers’ 
corps did not change any of the terms. Another supplier admitted that “[i]f you don’t have a point 
of leverage, you don’t have much ability to fight back.”56 Other attempts by suppliers to 
collectively draft a more favorable form to the seller, which were made under the umbrellas of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
53. We are aware of only one case in which a supplier rejected the contract and argued lack of 
mutuality. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Steel Dynamics, No. CR-04-056983-CK (Cir. Ct. Oakland County, Mich. 2004). 
54.  Bradford Wernle, Ford Vendors Balk at Tough Contract, Auto. News, July 5, 2004, at 8. 
55. Amy Wilson & Bradford Wernle, Ford Give Suppliers Tough Terms, Auto. News, Feb. 16, 2004, 
at 1 (quoting the CEO of a Ford supplier). 
56. Id. (quoting a supplier executive). 
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 their trade association (OESA),57 have not, as far as we can tell, influenced even a single term of 
the OEMs’ contract forms. 
A. Lower Tier Contracts 
When we move down from OEM contracts to lower tiers in the supply chain, bargaining 
power is no longer one-sided. Tier-1 suppliers cannot exert the same influence on tier-2s as 
OEMs exerted against them. For one, tier-1 suppliers do not offer the same magnitude and rarity 
of deals as OEMs do. If an OEM turns down a bid by a manufacturer of passenger seats, a big 
chunk of the business cannot be salvaged. On the other hand, if the same manufacturer of seats 
breaks the negotiations with the supplier of leather, that supplier would have many other business 
opportunities. Moreover, under contracts with OEMs, tier-1 suppliers occasionally are bound to 
use specific tier-2 suppliers. Similarly, once awarded a big contract by the OEMs, tier-1s have 
less flexibility to turn down suppliers. Time is of the essence and the tier-1 supplier must secure 
its own sources of supply, exposing it to potential hold-up by a tier-2 supplier who is particularly 
well-positioned to supply the goods in time. 
Still, we find that tier-1 suppliers have some success overcoming these weaknesses and 
imposing their own terms on their suppliers. Some tier-1 self-drafted contracts include terms that 
their own attorneys admit are more onerous than the OEM terms. For example, the tier-1 contract 
we saw provided that the tier-2 supplier must indemnify the buyer for 100% of the liability that 
the buyer bears vis-à-vis the OEM. That is, while OEM contracts either leave the issue of the 
division of liability for costly recalls and other defects open or impose a 50%-unless-otherwise-
agreed-upon split, the tier-1 contract imposed a 100% liability on the supplier.58 The reason, it 
was explained to us, is that OEMs have the ex post power, once a recall occurs, to dictate the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
57. OESA, supra note 11. 
58. See Delphi Corp. General Terms and Conditions, supra note 24. 
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 supplier’s share, and there is not much a disgruntled supplier can do other than plead for a fair 
allocation. On the other hand, tier-2 suppliers can fight back and in some events litigate or seek 
arbitration to settle these issues. Thus, to counter the greater ex post power of tier-2s, that 
contract was written with a more onerous term. 
Moreover, when terms are disputed by their suppliers at the negotiation stage, tier-1 
companies resort to what can be labeled a “golden rule.” Since pro-buyer boilerplate terms were 
imposed on the tier-1 by the OEMs when the tier-1s played the role of a seller, it is only fair that 
the tier-1 company would use symmetric terms in their roles as buyers. The argument made by 
tier-1s, that they cannot afford to give their sellers better terms because they cannot turn around 
and negotiate similar concessions as sellers to the OEMs, is often successful. It is this 
mechanism that causes the OEM terms to be replicated downstream. 
B. Sellers’ Power Due to Switching Costs  
An important factor that appeared to influence the contracts among the OEMs and 
suppliers was the OEMs’ significant switching costs. All of the OEM representatives, while 
recognizing that they have much of the bargaining power at the bidding stage, acknowledged that 
the pendulum shifts and suppliers may have some power in the course of carrying out a long-
term contract. Many current contracts are for intricate sub-assemblies that will be installed 
wholesale into a finished automobile. For example an OEM might buy the entire heating and 
cooling system from a supplier, and the supplier might be the principal designer of the system. 
Since any such system must integrate with the car’s electrical and other systems and must 
conform to the physical location that is set aside for it in the completed automobile, the “part” 
may be unique. It is this uniqueness that accords the supplier the power. 
Put differently, there are high switching costs in auto manufacturing. Switching costs are 
high because of the significant technological investments that other suppliers would have to 
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 expend to be able to fill the required order. For example, a tier-1 supplier may make all of the 
frames of a high-volume vehicle. That supplier built an assembly line to manufacture the frames 
and had considerable difficulty meeting the OEM’s technological requirements. These same 
complexities of building and operating an entire assembly line would confront any new supplier 
if the OEM fired its current supplier. Such difficulties cannot be overcome in a short period of 
time.59
Switching costs are also high because of safety problems. If the supplier’s work relates to 
the brakes, engine operation, passenger restraints or the car’s suspension, defects may pose 
safety risks and may be an integral part of the OEM’s satisfaction of governmental safety 
regulations. If the replacement of one supplier’s part with another’s would require additional 
safety tests to comply with governmental regulations, one can be sure that any change of 
suppliers would be costly and time consuming. Moreover, even without having to comply with 
safety regulations, switching costs may be high because of the need to integrate the component 
with other parts and to test its performance before assembling it into the vehicle. It is for these 
reasons that an OEM usually relies upon the “sole-source” supply method, under which it 
purchases its requirements of parts or raw materials from one supplier. Using more than one 
supplier—either by switching over time, or contemporaneously—would significantly increase 
the testing and tooling costs, lead to inconsistent quality, and undermine economies of scale. 
If an OEM who abandons a supplier would suffer prohibitive costs in finding and 
qualifying a replacement, it may be conjectured that the original supplier has some economic 
                                                                                                                                                                           
59. But see Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments: 
Subcontracting in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2636 (2000) (providing an account of the 
Japanese auto industry and suggesting that relationship-specific investments and switching costs play less of a role 
than is usually assumed). 
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 power over the OEM for the contracted goods or services for some period—perhaps even to the 
end of the model run of the vehicle in which the part or assembly is installed. This power, we 
should expect, would be at its height shortly after production commences when the supplier 
looks forward to five years of work, and when the competing bidders have turned to other things. 
In fact, this conjecture—that a tier-1 supplier can exert hold-up power against an OEM after 
production begins—is widely recognized as the benchmark example in economic theory for the 
general problem of contractual hold-up. The standard account of the hold-up problem was 
developed and generically illustrated in the context of the very same OEM/tier-1 contracts that 
we explored. It suggests that in the 1920s Fisher Body (a tier-1 supplier of automotive bodies) 
had a ten-year requirements contract with General Motors. When GM’s requirements increased 
due to the greater demand for closed-body cars, Fisher Body enjoyed an “intolerable” position to 
hold up General Motors and to refuse to make adjustments that were overall efficient, and was 
therefore acquired and vertically integrated into GM.60 It is not clear how much evidence 
substantiates the GM/Fisher Body hold-up story,61 and yet it seems plausible that in light of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
60. See Klein et al., supra note 1; Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: 
The Fisher Body – General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 199 (1988). The Klein account of 
the Fisher Body—GM merger and its illustrative role for the theory of the firm has been widely embraced. See, e.g., 
Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 13 (2d ed. 1994).  
61. In recent studies, Ronald Coase and others have argued that GM’s takeover of Fisher Body did not 
intend to solve contractual hold-up by Fisher Body—in fact, no such hold-up ever occurred—but rather to secure 
GM’s stronghold over a critical supplier vis-à-vis other OEMs. See R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body By 
General Motors, 43 J.L. & Econ. 15 (2000); Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 23 (2003); 
Robert Freeland, Creating Holdup Through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited, 43 J.L. & Econ. 33 (2000); 
Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable of Fisher Body, 43 J.L. & Econ. 67 (2000). 
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 high switching costs, OEMs would indeed be vulnerable to rent-extraction. As one leading 
economist explains: 
Why did GM and Fisher Body not simply write a better contract? Arguably, GM 
recognized that, however good a contract it wrote with Fisher Body, [. . .] 
contingencies might occur that no contract could allow for. GM wanted to be sure 
that next time around it would be in a stronger bargaining position; in particular, it 
would be able to insist on extra supplies, without having to pay a great deal for 
them.62
Our own findings suggest that, at least in the automotive business, this bargaining 
position/hold-up account is misguided. For one, the contracts are pretty good at dealing with this 
problem, as we will show below. But even without looking into the contractual language, this 
account ignores the fact that each individual transaction is only part of a larger portfolio of 
business, both concurrently and into the future. Even for unique goods, the power of the supplier 
to hold its buyer up is effectively limited. If the seller uses its power to engage in explicit hold-
up (e.g. “Give me an increase in price or I won’t ship”) he knows he will lose in the long run. 
One OEM representative emphasized that the buyers “have long memories” and assured us that a 
successful threat by a seller would surely count against it in the award of new contracts. Even 
more threatening, the representative told us, is that a major disruption at one OEM is likely to 
become known to the others and to be considered by other OEMs when bids are being evaluated. 
Representatives of suppliers concurred with this skeptical view. If a supplier puts a gun to the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
62. Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 7 (1995). 
35 
35
Ben-Shahar and White:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2005
 head of the OEM, it would be “suicide,” they claim; the short-term benefit from extracting some 
concession will be more than offset by the long-term reputation sanction. 
The myth that suppliers can engage in hold-up overlooks a very basic fact. Suppliers 
trying to hold up OEMs must threaten to halt production of a part that is necessary to keep the 
assembly line working. Such a threat, if carried out, would lead to enormous losses, constituting 
an entire melt down in the industry. The tier-1 supplier who commits such a hold-up would 
therefore be subjected to potentially bankrupting damages, some of which can be setoff by the 
OEM against the supplier’s account as a matter of self-help. Moreover, the OEM would likely be 
able to get injunctive relief,63 thus barring such a threat from being carried out in the first place. 
In other words, the hold-up account assumes lethargic contractual obligation and legal 
enforcement, which is probably far from reality. 
Moreover, in his rebuttal of the Fisher Body myth, Ronald Coase speculated that 
problems of supplier hold-up can be addressed by OEMs contractually.64 We have seen some 
evidence for such contractual arrangements. First, OEMs have almost unconstrained authority to 
terminate contracts. That is, if anyone has the contractual power to threaten to walk away, it is 
the OEM, not the supplier. True, they may not want to terminate a contract for supply of unique 
parts, but they can threaten to terminate other contracts with this same supplier, to “phase out” its 
business. Second, OEMs maintain significant property rights in “tooling,” namely in the 
machines and production assets at the suppliers’ plants, and they can haul these assets away once 
                                                                                                                                                                           
63. Johnson Controls v. A.P.T. Critical Sys., 323 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
64. See Coase supra note 61. 
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 the contract is terminated, often with only stingy compensation for suppliers’ sunk investment.65 
Thus, a supplier is in effect posting a bond against hold-up; their investment will be amortized in 
the course of production, but only if they stick around for the long haul.66 Third, OEMs reserve 
for themselves, in other boilerplate terms, the right to control the very profitable market for 
service parts for years, sometimes decades, into the future, and to potentially share this profit 
with suppliers. Suppliers that hold up the OEM in the short run will lose in a big way in the 
division of the aftermarket surplus. Finally, buyers in this industry do enjoy some success in 
securing court injunctions against breach,67 and can thus fend off suppliers who are holding up in 
order to renegotiate existing terms. 
In his rebuttal of the GM-Fisher Body myth, Coase then is correct in asserting that 
contractual provisions can protect OEMs from hold-up.68 But a more important aspect, we 
believe, and one that is also recognized by Coase, is that the “concern for their reputation would 
                                                                                                                                                                           
65. See also Miwa and Ramseyer, supra note 59, at 2642; Baird, supra note 61, at 26 (noting that the 
GM/Fisher hold-up account is not plausible because GM could have retained ownership of dies, which it would be 
able to retrieve in case Fisher engaged in hold-up). 
66. This ownership-of-tooling mechanism may appear to conform in part to the Klein-Crawford-
Alchian hypothesis, that the problem of hold-up is addressed through vertical integration. See supra note 1. What we 
found in the contracts is indeed an ownership solution, but not one that rises to complete integration. Instead, OEMs 
have devised a subtle scheme in which they maintain partial ownership rights in the supplier’s tooling, rights that 
gradually diminish over the life of the contract, as the hold-up scare diminishes. The rights do not give them actual 
control of the organization of production, but may allow them to exclude commingling and other uses, thereby 
reducing the alternative value of the assets to the supplier. 
67. See, e.g., Delphi Auto. Sys. v. Eaton Corp., No. 05-55257-CK (Mich. Cir. Ct. Saginaw County 
Jan. 31, 2005) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
68. Coase, supra note 61, at 30. 
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 also have deterred the Fisher brothers from engaging in [hold-up].”69 The explanations we heard 
from all the participants confirmed that it is indeed the OEMs’ long memories and the sanctions 
they can levy upon bad suppliers in future deals—that is, reputation sanctions—that render hold-
up a bad strategy for tier-1 suppliers. Any short-term gain to be had by this offensive bargaining 
tactic will be greatly offset by long-term losses in future deals. The “hold-up myth” fails because 
it is based on a false empirical assumption that suppliers specialize in a single part or assembly. 
In reality, many of the suppliers—and the large ones in particular—supply hundreds of parts and 
assemblies to the OEMs. Their business is not to supply a part, but a portfolio of parts. Even if 
they have some power with respect to one part, it does not change the fact that as suppliers of 
portfolios whose only clients are the few OEMs, they are captives, rather than hijackers. That is, 
the business plan of these supply firms—large diversified companies that specialize in 
automotive parts—is to build a symbiotic relationship with their clients, a fabric of reliability 
that will be completely undermined by hold-up. 
Thus, if long-term contracts confer power on the weaker seller, but if the seller cannot 
engage in hold-up, how is that power used? First the power ameliorates the standard contract 
termination or cancellation terms. If the buyer cannot find a replacement, it cannot exercise its 
legal right to cancel. Second, particularly with a weak supplier, the contract may mitigate an 
OEM’s setoff or hold-back of funds earned where the OEM claims that the supplier broke the 
contract. If the supplier is in a weak financial state, the OEM risks losing the supplier’s 
production if it reduces the supplier’s cash flow by setoff. We suspect that the seller’s power is 
also expressed in more subtle effects on the buyer’s use of its boilerplate. For example we can 
imagine buyers hesitating to be as aggressive as they might be in using the boilerplate indemnity 
provision against an important seller. As we suggest above, a seller needs to be felicitous in its 
                                                                                                                                                                           
69. Id.
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 use of this power (e.g. “Can you give me some help with my increased material costs?”) to 
escape identification as a chiseler who should be avoided when new contracts are awarded. 
Further, since many tier-1 suppliers produce a portfolio of parts, they can leverage the power 
they have in the supply of one crucial component to secure additional deals for other parts. 
C. Bankruptcy 
The picture of a weak tier-1 supplier, squeezed by powerful OEMs that demand ever 
growing discounts, can change dramatically when the supplier experiences insolvency. When this 
happens, suppliers’ threats to stop performing critical contracts become credible. They are 
credible because they come not from a company that is concerned with long-term business, but 
from stern bankruptcy workout specialists who have no attachment to next year’s business or 
even to next month’s if current crises can be surmounted.70 In the automotive industry of today, 
where suppliers’ bankruptcy has become a real danger,71 and their threat to file in Chapter 11 
more credible, many suppliers who are known to be suffering losses have a more powerful 
negotiation position vis-à-vis their buyers.72
                                                                                                                                                                           
70. For a general discussion of why threat to breach becomes credible in bankruptcy, see Oren Bar-
Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 717 (2005). See also Jeffrey McCracken, Plan OK’d 
for Aid to Keep C & A Supplying, Detroit Free Press, July 8, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 10705184. 
71. During the time we conducted this study, five major automobile suppliers filed in Chapter 11: 
Delphi (the world’s largest tier-1 supplier), Tower Automotive (a builder of frames for the Ford Explorer), Intermet 
(a steel supplier), Meridian (a steering parts producer) and Collins and Aikman (a maker of plastic trim, interior 
fabric and plastic parts such as dash board consoles and head liners). See Robert Sherefkin, Suppliers’ Woes Put 
Bond Ratings on the Junk Heap, Auto. News, Aug. 8, 2005, at 1. 
72. For example, prior to filing for bankruptcy, tier-1 supplier Delphi issued a threat to General 
Motors and to the UAW, demanding renegotiation of many prior agreements. See Brett Clanton, Delphi’s Troubles 
May Cost GM, Detroit News, Aug. 31, 2005, at 1. 
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 Ironically, at times when the supplier’s costs increase unexpectedly it is that very 
weakness of the supplier’s economic power and its inability to secure modifications to the 
contracts with the OEMs that can send it to bankruptcy, and eventually bolster the credibility of 
its threat. Threats from the weak and desperate are more powerful than threats from the strong 
and rational. Indeed, the increasing hardship of the American automotive industry provides 
ample examples of this unfortunate dynamic.73 They confirm that tier-1 suppliers have no power 
to hold up the OEMs when the OEMs know that their suppliers regard the costs of long-term 
retribution as greater than the near term gains from improved terms. But when retribution loses 
its effect, hold-up can be significant. Still, suppliers generally believe that even if it is bankruptcy 
that drives the price renegotiation the victorious supplier will suffer significant detriments in 
future dealings. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
73. One prominent example is Collins and Aikman (C&A), a tier-1 supplier who entered bankruptcy 
in May 2005. This company, which makes parts used in 90% of American cars, many of which are irreplaceable 
complex assemblies manufactured in factories that are symbiotically attached to OEMs’ plants, was unable to 
leverage the uniqueness of its products into profitable contracts. The more it grew, the more dependent it became on 
future contracts from the OEMs and the weaker was its economic power in the bargaining game. When C&A filed 
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, it threatened to stop performance unless its contracts were renegotiated and the 
prices increased—that is, it engaged in classic hold-up. Given its well-known cash shortage and the demands of 
unsecured creditors to stop performance of losing contracts, C&A had a credible threat. The payoff from the use of 
this power was quick: the three OEMs agreed to give C&A $82.5 million by raising the prices on their existing 
supply contracts with C&A by 15%, to purchase $140 million of tooling, and to make a loan of $82.5 million. See 
McCracken, supra note 70. 
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 IV. The Exceptions: Deviations from the Boilerplate 
A. Information Technology Transactions. 
In this sea of refusal to budge, which we describe above, we did find one area where the 
OEMs often negotiate boilerplate terms and agree to deviate from the global terms. All of the 
OEMs reported that their relationship with respect to information technology (IT) providers was 
different from their relationship with respect to conventional suppliers. IT suppliers sometimes 
successfully force the OEMs to sign on to their own forms; other times they successfully 
negotiate revisions of the standard global terms in areas of great importance. In fact, some OEMs 
have drafted different forms for IT suppliers. Ordinarily, IT suppliers insist on terms that grant 
them greater ownership in the intellectual property. They also successfully limit their liability 
and cap it at a level far below the liability that conventional suppliers may face, usually not to 
exceed the price paid for the component. Finally, they are reluctant to provide the same types of 
extensive warranties that OEMs usually demand. 
Why do IT suppliers succeed in extracting more favorable boilerplate? We heard 
explanations focusing on the concentration and leverage of the IT suppliers, led by Microsoft and 
other superpowers. This is probably true in the automotive context, where the IT firms are more 
diverse suppliers, less dependent on their OEM buyers. But this explanation does not account for 
the fact that even less powerful IT suppliers enjoy the more favorable terms. Another conjecture 
is that for IT companies, the intellectual property clauses in the contracts are critical, as this is 
their only asset. Standing to lose more from the OEMs’ IP provisions, their resistance to these 
expropriatory clauses is therefore more credible. 
And yet IT firms succeed not only in securing better intellectual property terms, but also 
far more lenient warranty and remedies provisions. We found this feature to be the most 
puzzling. Could it be explained by the fact that, unlike the ordinary tier-1 “assemblers,” IT firms 
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 do not buy “parts” and therefore do not have many tier-2s to which they can turn around and 
dump similar anti-seller terms?  
The prevalence of warranty and remedy limitations in the IT area can perhaps be 
explained by the nature of information products. It is often difficult to determine whether a 
defect in the operation of the integrated component is a result of bugs in the software or 
inadequate specification requested by the client. When a machine shuts down due to software 
problems, the consequential harm may be huge, and yet the fix may be simple and cheap. 
Moreover, IT firms provide their services to a variety of industries and products. Similar 
technologies and information can be adapted to heterogeneous products and applications. Thus, it 
is beyond the expertise of the IT supplier to foresee the types and magnitude of the consequential 
harm that a defect might cause, and it is therefore hard to insure. Self-insurance by the more 
specialized buyer makes economic sense. As a result, suppliers of IT are unwilling to provide 
warranties beyond repair and replacement. 
Japanese Manufacturers. Outside the area of IT contracts, we discovered that at least 
some of the Asian OEM’s will modify some parts of their boilerplate terms. One tier-1 supplier 
reported that a Japanese OEM would listen to focused and well reasoned objection to particular 
provisions of its form contract. The tier-1 supplier emphasized that even the Japanese OEM 
would not agree to wholesale changes to its form, but he made clear that the Japanese attitude 
toward negotiation was markedly different from that of American OEMs. Another source 
confirmed that while Toyota and Honda have contracts with strict terms, they view their 
relationship with suppliers as long-term and place more value on suppliers’ satisfaction. 
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 So why are the Japanese OEMs more generous than the American OEMs to their 
suppliers? Doubtless part of the reason is cultural,74 having to do with norms of negotiations and 
the like.75 Also, it is sometimes speculated that Japanese manufacturers may be sensitive to the 
hostile publicity that they might earn if they contribute to the demise of a large American 
manufacturer of supply parts.76 But we believe that an important reason is the economic distress 
of the American OEMs. Several representatives traced the current state of “war” between OEMs 
and suppliers to a managerial change that occurred in General Motors in the 1980s. Earlier, 
American OEMs in general, and GM in particular, were more generous with suppliers in all 
phases of their relations. But the mounting losses of the auto manufacturers could find an outlet 
in only a few places. Even though improvident contracts for pay, pensions, and health benefits 
with the UAW may be the principal cause of the current economic distress, no OEM has the 
power to open a labor contract and get large concessions from the union. That meant OEMs 
turned to easier prey: their suppliers. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
74. See generally John L. Graham, The Japanese Negotiation Style: Characteristics of a Distinct 
Approach, 9 Negotiation J. 123 (1993). 
75. The following anecdote illustrates the type of behavior that we denote “cultural.” One of our 
respondents in an American tier-2 company explained how a tier-1 Japanese supplier agreed to give a price 
increase. The American supplier had agreed to make and sell a part to the tier-1 supplier for approximately 
$3.00. When the first parts were delivered they were missing one weld. The weld had been identified on the 
drawings in Japanese and the seller had failed to translate that part of the instructions. When the parties discovered 
this, the Japanese buyer agreed to add 7¢ to the price to cover the cost of the additional weld—with the admonition 
that the seller had better get it right the next time. The seller's representative assured us that any American OEM 
would have "pointed to the contract" and forced the seller to eat the cost. 
76. Norihiko Shirouzu, Toyota Lobbies to Avoid Blame Amid U.S. Auto Industry Woes, Wall St. J., 
Aug. 12, 2005, at A2. 
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 Most of the Japanese manufacturers (Nissan and Mitsubishi may be exceptions) have not 
suffered the same distress. Both Toyota and Honda have been consistently profitable77 for many 
reasons, e.g. good management, the absence of union contracts with their American workers, the 
comparative youth of their American workers, and the Japanese state’s assumption of some of 
the liabilities in Japan that private companies must bear in the United States. Both the earlier 
American experience and reason suggest that insistence on one’s own tough terms with no 
exceptions is the kind of thing that no business person does without a strong economic incentive, 
like business distress. 
“Backdoor” Negotiations. Staff attorneys within the OEMs are of course the organ that 
keeps the tightest control on the boilerplate terms and guards against deviations. Other organs—
specifically, engineers and purchasing agents—may have slightly divergent goals and 
motivations. The purchasing representatives are interested in the cost of the item and their 
performance is measured by their success in getting the lowest price. Engineers are interested in 
quality and uniqueness of features, and operation and are less interested in cost. The engineering 
success is measured by how well the car works, the extent of warranty obligation it causes and, 
of course, how well it sells. A time honored but relatively crude way for a supplier to get better 
legal terms is to convince the OEM engineers that the supplier’s part is the only acceptable part 
and to get the engineer to write the specifications to exclude others. Or one might get the 
engineers to agree to “engineering change orders” that modify the specification of the part, 
enable the supplier to quote a new price (without going through a competitive bidding process), 
                                                                                                                                                                           
77. Jay Palmer, Taking on the World: Toyota’s Revving Up for a Bigger Chunk of the Global Auto 
Market, Barron’s Online, May 5, 2003, reprinted at 
http://www.logos4me.com/Investment%20News/Taking%20on%20the%20World.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2005); 
Yuval Rosenberg et al., The Top Picks from 50 Great Investors, Fortune, Dec. 29, 2003, at 70. 
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 and increase the profit on the sale of the part. These ploys that result in higher prices offset some 
of cost of unfavorable boilerplate. 
More subtle indirect changes in the contract may also come in through the engineers or 
by the addition of a term that the purchasing manager does not regard as part of his “cost.” For 
example a supplier may negotiate for a side agreement that permits the supplier to use the OEM’s 
tooling to make aftermarket parts, a right that the boilerplate would deny. Since the supplier’s 
profit on the aftermarket parts may be substantial, yet the purchasing manager might not regard 
that as part of his “price,” the seller gets something of considerable value. One tier-1 
representative spoke of the pricing for service parts and change in the terms of the warranty 
process as examples of terms in the boilerplate that the OEM’s might alter by a side agreement, if 
a successful pitch has been made to an organ within the OEM who cares more about other 
factors. In these cases too, the base price stated in the contract would not change but the change 
would have measurable and predictable value for the supplier. 
Conclusion 
So there you have it—sophisticated companies use the rigid boilerplate forms to govern 
tens of billions of dollars of sales every year. The drafters of these forms are not the least 
embarrassed in admitting that they draft every term in a one-sided, self-serving manner. It turns 
out that such unrestrained economic power in contracting is exercised not merely against the 
weak and ill advised, but also against sophisticated partners to relational contracts. And yet, in 
numerous discussions with suppliers and their representatives, we have not heard the word 
“unconscionability” even once. Obviously, there is no element of duress or unfair surprise in the 
formation of these contracts. It is the understanding of all who are involved in this market that 
bargaining power is the name of the game, and that the only way to reform the contracts is to 
alter some fundamental features of this market, to affect the division of economic power. 
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 Our study has obvious limitations. Since our primary interest was the boilerplate 
contracts, the evidence we collected came from “legal” sources—the contracts, the lawyers who 
draft them, the lawyers representing the parties to the purchase agreements, and the very small 
body of case law. In the shadow of this legal cloud there may be a different business reality in 
which transactions occur in a more balanced way, where OEMs exercise their power and their 
contractual entitlements in a selective and less selfish manner. While we cannot rule out such a 
possibility, it does not seem plausible. Representatives of suppliers with whom we spoke 
exhibited too much frustration with the OEMs’ legal terms; they appear to believe that the reality 
of the business is consistent with the picture portrayed by the boilerplate. 
What are the lessons that can be drawn from this study? Unlike some prior studies of 
automotive contracts, we do not claim any general conclusions about contractual behavior, nor 
do we aim any critique at the law or advocate any legal reform. The automotive production 
business is sufficiently idiosyncratic that much of what we have learned may be applicable only 
to this industry. For one, it is clear that much of the bargaining power account stems from the 
specific structure of the industry, in which specialized tier-1 companies are “captives”—they 
have immense investments in production capacity and can sell only to a handful of clients. But 
this study does show patterns that may have broader application. It identifies the important role 
that internal organization structures play in the formation of form contracts.  A story we all heard 
many times is that organizational concerns can explain the necessity of standard forms. That is, 
forms are a way for principals to exert control over terms offered by their agents. But what we 
found here was the flip side of this account. The internal hierarchy is not the reason for the 
forms, but rather an instrument in implementing the forms as-is, without allowing any erosion of 
the terms. Constantly under pressure by counterparties to vary some terms, buyers have erected 
artificial internal structures to prevent purchasing agents from yielding to such pressures. This 
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 internal rigidity also explains the absence of “menus”—the refusal of the drafting party to set 
prices under which its counterparties can “buy” better terms. 
While some of our findings can be explained with clear economic logic, for others we did 
not find a compelling explanation. We do not offer a satisfactory explanation for the variance of 
terms across the different OEM contracts, or for the conjecture that some terms are inefficient. If 
we are right in suggesting that there is inefficiency in the legal provisions, it is possible—given 
the enormous stakes in this industry—that a lot of money is left on the table. Clearly, the OEMs 
are using any means to reduce costs and are pressuring their suppliers to the maximum extent. 
But by using such harsh terms, the OEMs may be creating (or at least, not eliminating) the 
deadweight loss. Another finding that left us puzzled is the IT forms; these are a remarkable 
exception to the otherwise one-sided boilerplate in the industry. We can offer only guesses as to 
why IT firms succeed in securing better terms. We leave this question for future inquiry. 
Finally, this study reinforces some doubts about theories of asymmetric information in 
contracting. We mentioned that a prominent line of thought in economic theory identifies 
contractual “failures” as the reason for why firms organize the way they do, and why some 
activities are outsourced and others are done in-house. Since auto production contracts have 
served an important role in demonstrating these insights (the GM/Fisher Body story), we took a 
closer look at the actual contracts. We discovered a reality in which more things are 
“contractible” than previously suggested; where asymmetric information and imperfect 
verification are rarely obstacles for contracting; and where reputation sanctions quickly fill any 
void that the contracts may have left. And yet, the familiar economic story of vertical integration 
is not necessarily undermined. While it is not manifested through outright takeover of supplier 
firms, we discovered that integration in production occurs in more subtle ways, such as 
contingent control over production assets and technological innovations.
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